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ABSTRACT
Many firms issue stock options to all employees. We consider three potential economic justifications
for this practice: providing incentives to employees, inducing employees to sort, and helping firms
retain employees. We gather data on firms' stock option grants to middle managers from three
distinct sources, and use two methods to assess which theories appear to explain observed granting
behavior. First, we directly calibrate models of incentives, sorting and retention, and ask whether
observed magnitudes of option grants are consistent with each potential explanation. Second, we
conduct a cross-sectional regression analysis of firms' option-granting choices. We reject an
incentives-based explanation for broad-based stock option plans, and conclude that sorting and
retention explanations appear consistent with the data.
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The use of stock option grants in compensation plans for middle- and lower-level employees has
attracted ample attention in recent years. The increase in the prevalence of this practice presents
a challenge to economists interested in rms' relations with their employees.1 Because the eventual
value of a stock option is tied to the value of a single rm, this form of compensation subjects
employees to a considerable amount of risk. In order for broad option grants to be optimal, there
must therefore be osetting benets. In this paper, we propose and empirically examine a number
of potential sources of benets stemming from stock-option-based compensation.
We focus our analysis on three possible benets to rms from stock-option usage. First, option
grants may provide incentives to employees. Linking an employee's wealth to the value of the rm
may overcome agency problems and motivate the employee to take actions that are in the rm's
interest. Second, option grants may induce sorting. As with any form of non-cash compensation,
potential employees may have heterogeneous assessments of the value of a rm's option grant. We
consider the case where employees dier in their beliefs regarding the rm's prospects, providing an
opportunity for rms to reduce compensation costs by using options to attract optimistic employees.
Third, options may help rms retain employees. Any form of deferred compensation will make it
costly for employees to leave. However, options may be especially useful for this purpose when stock
prices and labor market conditions are positively correlated because they can index employees'
deferred compensation to their outside opportunities.
We gather data from three distinct sources and seek to determine which explanation is most
consistent with the option grants we observe. Our data sources oer osetting strengths and
weaknesses. Our rst source, a survey conducted in 2000 by the National Center for Employee
Ownership (NCEO) provides detailed information regarding salary and option packages oered
to middle-level executives. However, because the NCEO surveyed only those rms it believed to
have broad-based stock option plans, this sample is not useful for exploring across-rm variation
in option-granting behavior.
Second, we randomly choose 1,000 publicly traded rms that led both annual reports and
proxy statements with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in calendar 1999. From
these disclosures, we gather information on the number of options granted to employees in the
1Mehran and Tracy (2001) document the increase in employee stock option grants at large, publicly traded
companies during the 1990's.
1preceding scal year. While this data source is representative and allows us to use detailed rm-
level information, the nancial disclosures do not oer detailed information regarding grants made
to middle-level employees.
Our third data source is the Bureau of Labor Statistics' (BLS) Pilot Survey of option grants
made in 1999. This survey oers fairly detailed information regarding option grants, and is also
selected to be representative of the U.S. economy as a whole. The main limitation of this data source
is condentiality | to insure high response rates, the BLS restricts researchers from learning the
identities of the individual rms that responded. Thus, we are unable to link option-granting
behavior to rm characteristics. Because of these limitations, we use the BLS data only to describe
the broad patterns of stock option usage in the U.S.
We apply two distinct empirical methods to distinguish between the theories proposed above.
First, we devise economic models of each theory, and calibrate these models using our NCEO data.
To do this, we assume the option packages observed in our NCEO data are the product of rms'
optimization over possible grant sizes. Given this, we can ask what the underlying parameters of
each model must be in order to give rise to the observed option grants. We ask, for example, what
an employee's production function must look like if observed option packages are optimal incentive
instruments. How optimistic must employees be regarding the rm's prospects if option grants are
driven by sorting? How large must short-run wage variation be if option grants are designed for
retention? Second, we use our SEC sample to estimate a series of regressions that relate rms'
decisions to adopt a broad-based stock option plan to rm and industry characteristics.
Our calibration of the agency model indicates that the risk premiums associated with many
rms' option grants are several orders of magnitude larger than the cost to employees of the resulting
increases in eort. This nding conrms the intuition that observed option grants are too small
to provide strong incentives for middle-level managers. We conclude that middle-manager options
are sensible for incentive purposes only under a very limited set of circumstances | namely, if
employees can take actions that have very large value implications for the rm, the costs to the
employee of taking these actions is very small, and it is extremely dicult for rms to observe
whether employees are taking these actions.
Our results are far more consistent with the assertions that sorting and retention concerns
drive broad-based stock option granting decisions. Our calibrations, for example, indicate that a
somewhat risk-averse employee who expects his rm's stock to increase by about 25% annually
would prefer observed option-plus-salary packages to a cash-only compensation plan that costs
2the employer the same amount. We also nd that, if spot salaries for middle managers uctuate
by ve to twenty thousand dollars within a few years, rms may nd it more cost eective to
issue stock options to middle managers than to try to adjust wages as market wages uctuate.
Finally, we interpret our cross-sectional results as further evidence consistent with options creating
attraction and retention benets. Specically, we show that broad-based stock option plans are
more common at smaller rms, rms with more volatile stock returns (and especially rms in more
volatile industries), and rms with negative cash ow.
Two recent papers, Core and Guay (2001) and Kedia and Mozumdar (2002), study factors
that aect option grants to non-executives. These papers use a cross-sectional approach that is
methodologically similar to our logit analysis. Both papers, however, dene \non-executives" as
any employee other than the ve highest-paid executive ocers. At the cost of imposing some
assumptions on the distribution of grants within rms, we attempt to improve on this denition so
as to better capture grants to employees who are not senior managers. This dierence in approach,
as well as the insights we gain from our calibrations, lead to dierent conclusions. For example, Core
and Guay (2001) and Kedia and Mozumdar (2002) conclude that rms' option-granting decisions
are driven, at least in part, by concern for the provision of incentives.
Other authors, including Sesil, Kroumova, Blasi and Kruse (2002) and Ittner, Lambert and
Larcker (2003), have studied performance eects of stock option plans. This work generally treats
the adoption of stock option plans as an exogenous event, or at least takes adoption as given. Sesil
et al. (2002) study dierences in nancial outcomes for rms with and without stock options. Ittner
et al. (2003) study determinants of grants in a sample of rms that have stock option plans and
measure the success of these plans against the rms' stated objectives. Our work complements this
by identifying sources of performance improvements.2
Another body of work studies employee prot sharing (see, for example, Kruse (1993) and
Weitzman and Kruse (1990).) Like stock options, prot sharing links compensation to rm per-
formance. This literature has generally found small to negligible incentive and retention eects of
prot sharing. Some of our analysis is similar to the prot sharing literature in that we establish
characteristics of rms that issue stock options broadly.
2While we take as given that rms choose options as the form of equity to grant to employees, a few other papers
have studied the choice between stock grants and stock option grants. Barron and Waddell (2003b) and Oyer and
Schaefer (2003) study this decision for grants to executives and non-executives, respectively.
32 Incidence of Broad-Based Stock Option Plans
We rst examine the incidence of broad-based stock option plans, using two distinct sources of
data. First, we obtain a representative random sample of U.S. for-prot establishments from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Second, we select a random sample of 1,000 publicly traded U.S. rms,
and collect information about option-granting behavior from their 1999 nancial disclosures.
In 2000, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), an agency within the U.S. Department of La-
bor, conducted a survey of employee stock option grants during 1999. A total of 1,437 for-prot
establishments, employing 680,000 people, provided complete answers to the survey. The data gen-
erated by the BLS survey have several desirable properties for providing descriptive background on
the incidence of option grants. First, the BLS gets a very high response rate (over 75%) because
respondents know the condentiality of their responses will be strictly guarded.3 Second, the BLS
provides establishment-level weights that account for the distribution of establishment types in the
United States, and for non-response. We use these weights so that all of our analysis, subject to
standard sampling error issues, is representative of the U.S. economy in 1999.4
We generate two indicator variables intended to capture the breadth of establishment-level stock
option grants. First, we set \Any Options" equal to one for any establishment that granted any
stock options to any \non-owners" in 1999.5 Just 2.7% of U.S. establishments granted stock options
to non-owners in 1999. A second indicator variable is intended to mimic the NCEO measure of
broad-based stock option grants that we introduce below. The NCEO survey denes a program
as broad if at least half the employees at a rm are eligible for stock option grants. We cannot
compute a directly comparable measure using the BLS data, because the survey asks only about
actual grants made within calendar 1999. Even in rms where all employees are eligible for grants,
it may be the case that only a small fraction actually receive them within a given year. We
therefore approximate the NCEO measure with the indicator variable \Broad Plan," which we set
equal to one at any establishment that granted options to at least 20% of employees in 1999. Only
3The BLS data is available only to researchers who are granted Intergovernmental Personnel Act assignments. All
our work with this data was done on-site at the BLS in Washington, DC.
4While the BLS data are useful for descriptive purposes, their usefulness for other analysis is limited by the fact
that sampling was done as the establishment (rather than rm) level and that rm anonymity prevents us from
matching the option grant information to other nancial information.
5There is some ambiguity in the term \owner." Technically, anyone holding a share of stock is an owner. It
appears, however, that respondents interpreted \owner" as owner/operators, rather than as anyone holding shares.
4Table 1: BLS Sample Summary Statistics
Public and Private Firms Public Firms
All Firms with any grant All Firms with any grant
(1) (2) (3) (4)
B-S value of grants per $50 $3,331 $414 $3,508
employee (1,975) (15,826) (5,882) (16,833)
Average Salary per employee $31,107 $36,081 $35,438 $38,444
(54,843) (63,330) (55,629) (67,028)
% of employees with Salary < $35K 68.0% 65.8% 64.6% 66.0%
% of employees with Salary > $75K 6.0% 6.7% 6.7% 7.0%
Publicly Traded 11.2% 91.0% 100% 100%
New Economy 1.9% 31.3% 7.7% 34.%
\Broad Plan" 1.4% 52.0% 11.8% 53.5%
Sample Size 1437 150 373 137
Weighted Share of Sample 100% 2.7% 11.2% 2.5%
Establishment data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' 1999 Pilot Survey of Stock Option Grants. Non-prot
rms and rms that did not provide complete information are not included. BLS sample weights have been applied
to all numbers. \Broad Plan" indicates at least 20% of employees at the establishment were granted stock options
in 1999. \New Economy" indicates primary SIC code is 3570-3579, 3661, 3674, 5045, 5961, or 7370-7379. Standard
deviations in parentheses.
1.4% of establishments in the U.S. economy meet this broad plan criteria, though almost 12% of
establishments that are part of public companies qualify as having broad plans.
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the BLS data. We provide averages for all public and
private establishments, all establishments with option grants, all public establishments, and all
public establishments with option grants.6 From Column (1) we note that the value of options
granted at a typical rm is not very high. The average establishment issues $50 in Black-Scholes
value per employee, though the value is $414 at public companies and over $3,000 among rms
that issued any options.7 Establishments that make option grants have somewhat higher salaries
on average, though they do not have a noticeably dierent fraction of high salary (over $75K) or
6While columns (2) and (4) include 10% and 37% of their relative samples, respectively, these proportions fall to
2.7% and 22.1% when BLS sampling weights are applied.
7In computing these Black-Scholes values, we assume all options expire in ten years. Also, because we do not
observe the identity of the individual rm, we cannot use historical stock volatilities or implied volatilities from actual
option markets to value these options. Instead, we use 2-digit SIC-level averages of stock volatilities.
5low salary (under $35K) workers than establishments in the sample as a whole. Not surprisingly,
so-called \new economy" rms are over-represented among rms that grant options.8
The total Black-Scholes value of options granted equals approximately 3.55% of wages for all
rms and 25% of wages at rms that issue some options. Of the total options granted, executives
received 31.2% of the Black-Scholes value though they comprise only 2.4% of sample employment
and 1% of employment at option-granting public and private establishments. Non-executives with
annual salaries over $75,000, who comprise 3.7% of sample employment and 5.7% of employment
at public and private establishments that grant options, received 61.1% of the value of options
granted. Employees earning under $35,000 annually comprise 67.1% of sample employment and
received just 1.6% of the value of all options granted.
The BLS statistics make it clear that stock options are an important component of compensation
for non-executives at a large group of rms. While most rms do not distribute options widely, non-
executive options comprise a signicant majority of total grants. At those rms that grant options,
options compensation is an important part of total labor costs. Therefore, understanding why these
rms adopt this practice is an important question in understanding compensation practices.
Our second source of data is the SEC's EDGAR internet-based database of nancial disclosures.
From the approximately 7,000 rms that led both a proxy statement (DEF 14A) and an annual
report (10-K) with EDGAR during calendar 1999, we randomly select a sample of 1,000.9 We
gather data from these disclosures regarding the number of employee stock options issued. We
match this to data on accounting and stock returns from Compustat and CRSP.
The major drawback of the SEC data is its high level of aggregation; rms report how many
options were granted in total, but there is no detailed information regarding the options holdings
of employees other than top executives. Our aim is to construct measures of whether the rm has
a stock option plan for most employees and, if so, how many options (and of what value) a typical
employee holds. To construct these measures, we make use of two additional sources of information:
(1) how option holdings are distributed among the rm's ve most highly paid executives, and (2)
8Largely following Ittner et al. (2003), we dene rms as being part of the new economy if they manufacture
computers, semiconductors, or telephone equipment, if they wholesale computer-related products, or if they create
software. We augment Ittner et al.'s (2003) list with codes 3575, 7375, and 7379 because the SEC and NCEO rms
in these industries are internet-related.
9For most companies in our sample, the nancial statements we use refer to the scal year coinciding with calendar
1998. We refer to our analysis as relating to 1998, though the period covered includes part of 1997 or 1999 for some
rms.
6data from the NCEO survey on option grants.10
We begin by constructing an estimate of the number of options granted to non-executives. Core
and Guay (2001) and Kedia and Mozumdar (2002) dene non-executive stock option grants as
all grants to employees that are not among the ve highest paid workers at the rm. While this
measure is easy to construct consistently across rms, it undoubtedly overestimates the number
of options granted to non-executives because, at many rms, the sixth, seventh, etc. highest paid
executives also receive very large option grants.11 Because our aim is to study option grants to
middle-level employees, it does not seem appropriate to include grants to these top executives in
our measure.
Improving on a simple top ve executive cuto comes at the cost of imposing some assumptions,
however. CEOs often receive a signicantly greater option grant than anyone else at the rm, so we
start by focusing on the executives with the second through fth largest grants. We assume that
the highest 10% of employees at the rm receive an average grant one tenth as large as the average
executive in the second through fth compensation rank. We subtract these shares and shares
granted to the top ve executives from the total grants to employees, and assume the dierence
is the total shares granted to non-executives. If the dierence is negative, then we assume there
were no grants to non-executives. We dene an indicator variable (SEC Plan) that equals one if
the number of shares granted to non-executives represents at least 0.5% of the shares outstanding
in 1998.12
Table 2 displays summary statistics for the rms in the SEC dataset. All rms are included
in the rst column, while columns (2) and (3) partition the rms into groups with SEC Plan = 1
10We know with certainty whether or not the rms in the NCEO sample have a broad-based option plan. We
compare the survey data from the NCEO with the information in NCEO rms' SEC disclosures. Loosely, our approach
attempts to maximize the number of NCEO sample rms for which we accurately predict option plan status.
11To show the importance of option grants to executives who miss the top ve cuto, we used the Execucomp
dataset to look at option grants at companies that report compensation details for more than ve executives in a
given proxy statement. There are 3,236 rm/year observations with more than ve listed executives between 1996
and 2002. 57.4% of this sample made option grants to the fth highest paid executive, while 33.4% made grants
to the sixth highest paid. Among those who received grants, Execucomp's valuation of the Black-Scholes value of
the grants for the average (median) executive is $802K ($266K) for fth highest executives and $782K ($253K) for
sixth highest paid. Average and median grant values are similar for seventh and eigth highest paid executives in the
rm/years where details are provided.
12In Section 5 below, we construct two alternative indicators for the presence of a broad-based stock option plan
using our SEC data. Reproducing Table 2 with these indicators yields similar patterns.
7Table 2: SEC Sample Summary Statistics
All Firms Option Plan No Option Plan
(1) (2) (3)
Black-Scholes value of non-exec $17,891 $36,982 $288
grants per employee (52,351) (70,829) (1,285)
Grants to non-execs/Total Shares 2.2% 4.4% 0.1%
(4.2%) (5.2%) (0.1%)
Employees 5,684 970 10,032
(18,742) (2,519) (25,112)
Employee Growth 26.0% 38.2% 14.3%
(168%) (237%) (34%)
Market Value $1,660 $450.6 $2,815
12/98 { ($MM) (10,451) (1,605) (14,446)
Fraction with Positive Cash Flow 78.0% 61.9% 92.8%
1997 Stock Return 24.0% 20.0% 27.4%
(61.8%) (67.3%) (56.6%)
1998 Stock Return 5.9% 8.1% 4.2%
(82.5%) (108.1%) (49.8%)
1999 Stock Return 33.1% 62.0% 6.3%
(161.8%) (213.5%) (82.2%)
Monthly Volatility 17.5% 20.9% 14.2%
(9.6%) (10.2%) (7.7%)
New Economy 16.2% 26.2% 6.6%
Sample Size 798 390 408
Data are from a random sample of 1,000 rms that led 10-Ks and proxy statements with the SEC in calendar
1999. The nal sample of 798 rms includes those for whom we were able to gather stock return and other nancial
information. Column (2) includes rms that, during the covered scal year, we estimate issued options on at least
0.5% of its outstanding shares to employees who were not in the top 10% of its management ranks. Column (3)
includes rms that did not meet this criterion. This rate of grant is capped at 30%. \New economy" indicates
primary SIC code is 3570-3579, 3661, 3674, 5045, 5961, or 7370-7379. Standard deviations in parentheses.
8and SEC Plan = 0, respectively. We nd 48.9% of the rms in our sample had broad-based stock
option plans in 1998, though, because these plans are more common at small rms, only 8.3% of
employees in the sample worked at rms with SEC Plan = 1. Employees at SEC Plan = 1 rms
received average grants worth in excess of $36,000 (though the average option value at the median
rm with SEC Plan = 1 is only $6,551.) Table 2 makes clear that SEC Plan = 1 rms are strikingly
smaller, faster growing, and their stock returns are more volatile.13 New economy rms make up a
substantial portion of the rms with broad plans. Also, note that only three-fths of the rms with
broad plans generated positive cash ow in 1998 (dened as earnings before extraordinary items
plus depreciation), while more than 90% of the SEC Plan = 0 rms generated cash.
3 Models and Empirical Implications
In this section, we outline several models that may help explain why rms elect to issue options to a
broad group of employees. We summarize the implications of each model to motivate the empirical
analysis that follows.
3.1 Incentives
We rst describe an incentives-based justication for use of equity in compensation. Suppose the
value of the rm, V , depends on an employee's eort, e, as follows:14
V = ve + v;
where v is a normal random variable with mean zero and variance 2
v. Let the employee be
risk averse with coecient of absolute risk aversion '.15 Suppose further that the employee has
13Our adjustment to Core and Guay's (2001) method of measuring grants to non-executives appears to be im-
portant. Had we dened our SEC Plan variable similarly but without adjusting for possible grants to non-top-ve
executives, then we would have concluded that broad option plans are more common at larger rms. This suggests
that Core and Guay's (2001) nding that option-based incentives for non-executives are stronger at larger rms may
be an artifact of their data collection methodology. It may simply reect that larger rms grant more options to
non-top-ve executives.
14Here, we follow the linear contracting agency model studied by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987, 1991). While
this model's assumptions of linear contracts and normal disturbances are unlikely to be met in the option-based-pay
context we study here, it is convenient for its analytic simplicity. In our calibration below, we develop an agency
model that is more closely tailored to the stock-option context.
15We denote by ' a coecient of absolute risk aversion, and by  a coecient of relative risk aversion.
9quadratic eort costs, with second derivative c.
The optimal contract in this case is linear in rm value, and maximizes the total certainty
equivalent subject to the employee's incentive constraint. If b is the share of the rm that is owned






This analysis yields the standard comparative statics of agency theory. The employee's share is
higher when the variance of rm value, conditional on the employee's eort, is smaller; the marginal
return to eort, v, is higher; the second derivative of the employee's cost of eort function, c , is
smaller; and the employee is less risk averse.
While the second through fourth comparative statics are dicult to test without detailed infor-
mation about the production function or employees' preferences, one may think to test this theory
using the rst. In fact, there is a large literature testing this comparative static using the pay-
for-performance contracts of top executives. Murphy (2000) surveys many of the relevant papers.
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Jin (2002), for example, conrm the negative risk/incentive
relationship for Chief Executive Ocers, while Barron and Waddell (2003a) conrm the relation-
ship for the top ve executives at a given rm. Many other papers have analyzed this relationship
using the compensation data provided for ve executives in proxy statements or for a slightly larger
group of top managers surveyed by consulting rms (see, for example, Bushman, Indjejikian and
Smith (1995) and Keating (1997).) We test this prediction of the incentive model in our cross-rm
analysis of option plans in Section 5 below.
Previous cross-sectional tests of the risk/incentive relationship, as well as our test below, are
complicated by several factors, however. First is the potential correlation between the marginal
return to eort and the variance of the rm's market value. Given that the econometrician cannot
observe the marginal return to eort, any cross-sectional analysis of the link between incentives and
rm risk suers a potential omitted variable bias. If eort is more valuable in high-risk environments
(as Prendergast (2002) suggests it may be in some cases), then employees' ownership may appear
to be increasing in rm risk due to this correlation.
Second, equity-based instruments are not the only way in which rms can provide incentives to
employees. Firms use many measures that reect actions of individual employees. Agency theory
suggests that if an individual employee's performance is measured less precisely, then the rm
will substitute toward other measures, such as overall rm performance. Note the econometrician
typically cannot observe the ecacy of individual performance measures, so again cross-sectional
10tests suer from an omitted variable bias. Indeed, Core and Guay (2001) take this observation to
something of an extreme, arguing that \monitoring costs" (which one can interpret as the absence
of good measures of individual employee performance) are increasing in rm size, thus predicting
that larger rms should make greater use of option-based compensation. This prediction is the
opposite of what one might expect given that the variance of market value is typically higher for
larger rms.
Because of the diculty in measuring theoretically important constructs such as the marginal
return to eort and the variance of measures of individual performance, it is not clear what pattern
in cross-sectional data could reject an incentives-based explanation for stock option use. Given these
problems with cross-sectional tests, we therefore supplement standard methods with a dierent
approach. In Section 4.1 below, we directly calibrate an agency model, and ask whether the
observed option packages oered to middle managers appear to be an ecient means for providing
incentives.
3.2 Sorting
Next, we consider the possibility that rms may oer option-based compensation to induce workers
to sort into the most ecient employment matches. Traditional models of sorting (see, for example,
Lazear (2001) ) suggest rms may want to tie some of its employees' pay to rm performance as
a means of attracting able employees to work at the rm. However, non-executives generally have
suciently little eect on rm value that even a small amount of risk aversion would make the risk
costs of options dwarf the benets of this sorting. We therefore consider a model where employees
are heterogeneous in their beliefs regarding the rm's prospects. Given this assumption, the rm
may benet by using stock options to attract the optimistic employees. If employees value the rm's
stock options at more than their market price, then the rm can reduce its overall compensation
expenses by oering option-based pay packages.
There are three reasons why it may be advantageous to include such compensation as part
of an employment relationship, as opposed to simply letting optimistic employees purchase the
rm's shares in their own account. First, if optimistic employees are relatively willing to invest
in rm-specic human capital, to work hard, or are otherwise more productive, the rm needs
to make options a condition of employment to insure more productive workers self-select into the
rm. Second, there is a tax advantage. The employment relationship allows the employee to avoid
11paying taxes on the options until he exercises them.16 This allows the options to compound tax-
free (though the tax advantage is not large.) Finally, it may be that the rm can somehow reduce
overall transaction costs by making these grants centrally.17
This explanation for rms' option granting behavior has several empirical implications. First,
option grants will increase with employees' tax rates because the tax benets of being paid in
options will be greater. Given progressive income taxation, this suggests option grants should be
larger for higher-paid workers. Second, option grants will increase in the variance of employees'
beliefs about the value of options. If the variance of beliefs is greater, the rm will be able to
extract a larger compensation discount from the most optimistic workers. Finally, rms will be
more likely to grant options as the relative productivity of optimistic workers increases relative to
other workers.
3.3 Retention
Because options granted to employees typically have a vesting period attached, they have the eect
of increasing the costs to employees of departing the rm. Options may therefore help rms retain
employees. What is unclear, though, is why rms would use stock options for this purpose | any
form of compensation that is forfeited if employees leave will help with retention. Given that using
options for this purpose loads risk onto employees, one may wonder why rms would not simply
defer cash payments if retention is their aim.
The model in Oyer (2003) suggests an answer. If labor market conditions in a given industry
are positively correlated with rms' share prices, then options serve to index deferred compensation
16Firms issue two types of stock options to employees { \incentive stock options" (ISOs) and \non-qualied stock
options" (NQSOs). ISOs create signicant tax complications because they have the potential advantage of recognizing
more income as capital gains, but they can lead to Alternative Minimum Tax consequences. This has minimal eect
on our analysis because the IRS restricts issuance of ISOs and, therefore, a signicant majority of stock options issued
to individuals below the top executive level are NQSOs. Our BLS data show that 77% of the people who received
options grants in 1999 received only NQSOs, 15% received only ISOs, and 8% received both. The ISOs are skewed
towards senior executives. Some non-executives do receive ISOs and, therefore, our analysis slightly understates the
average (but not the median) tax advantages of stock options. See McDonald (2003) for details on employer tax
considerations in issuing options. We proceed under the assumption that the options we analyze are NQSOs.
17Employees may also gather inside information that enhances the value of the options they are granted (see
Huddart and Lang (2003)). However, employees can make full use of this information (and optimize given their
individual risk preferences) by trading on their own accounts. Thus, the presence of such inside information cannot
by itself explain why rms elect to issue options to employees.
12to employees' outside options. Consider a rm that is contemplating oering $100,000 in deferred
cash compensation versus $100,000 in Black-Scholes value of stock options. If it turns out that
labor markets are exceptionally tight, then the $100,000 in deferred cash may not be sucient to
induce the employee to stay with the rm. However, if the employee holds options, then it is likely
that the value of the option package will be substantially higher than $100,000 in the event that the
employee receives an attractive outside oer. The states of the world in which the rm incurs costs
from replacing the employee (if he leaves) or negotiating over a new wage (if he can be convinced
to stay) is smaller given the option package.
If, on the other hand, labor markets are slack, then the rm must still pay the employee the
$100,000 in deferred cash. For the option package, though, the realized value may be considerably
less than the initial Black-Scholes value. Given the widely held view that it is dicult for rms
to cut nominal salaries, the option package may be an eective way to link total compensation
to labor market conditions without resorting to nominal wage cuts. In Oyer's (2003) model, the
adoption of broad-based stock option plans increases with the rm's costs of replacing workers, the
variance of common shocks to rms participating in a given labor market, employee risk tolerance,
and variance in local market wages.
3.4 Other Explanations
We focus on the preceding three explanations in our analysis, but briey recount some others here.
3.4.1 Financing Constraints
Some have suggested that cash-constrained rms oer stock options to their employees as a substi-
tute for salary. This explanation may hold some intuitive appeal, especially given the prevalence
of option-based pay in new ventures. There is a substantial literature (see Stein (2001)) examining
information asymmetries in nancial markets; frictions in markets may lead to a preference for
internal nance.
We have two reservations regarding this hypothesis. First, the evidence on the relationship
between nancing constraints and option grants is, at best, mixed. Core and Guay (2001) nd that
option grants to \non-executives" are greater at rms that have larger cash ow shortfalls from
operations. Kedia and Mozumdar (2002) look for an association between option grants and several
proxies for nancing constraints. They nd that options grants are higher at rms with higher
losses carried forward, though they nd that option grants are not related to interest coverage or
13dividend payout. Ittner et al. (2003), on the other hand, nd \no evidence that cash constrained
new economy rms make greater use of equity-based compensation to conserve cash" using cash on
hand per employee and cash ow per employee as proxies for cash constraints. Finally, Bergman
and Jenter (2003) nd that non-executive grants are positively related to high cash levels and not
to leverage, interest burden, or distress. They argue that, \these ndings contradict the notion
that option compensation is used to alleviate nancing constraints."
Second, we argue this hypothesis is dicult to support with economic theory unless one allows
for the possibility that employees may have optimistic assessments of rm value. Corporate nance
theory suggests that rms should seek the lowest-cost forms of nancing; therefore, this \options-
as-nance" explanation is sensible only if asking employees to take a discount in salary is the
lower-cost way to nancing than, say, doing a seasoned equity oering. While there are transaction
costs associated with any equity oerings, there are a number of reasons why we would expect
the costs of using middle-level employees as nanciers would be higher. First, the informational
asymmetries aicting nancial markets would presumably aect attempts to nance through the
labor market as well. While employees may have the opportunity to gather ample information
regarding the rm's operations after they take the job, the decision by an employee to accept a
lower salary in exchange for equity is made before much of this information is gathered. Second,
even if a rm's employees are advantaged relative to outside nanciers in observing management's
actions, the weak control rights associated with small option grants means there is little employees
can do to protect their investments. Third, specialist nancial intermediaries would presumably
have more expertise in assessing new ventures and greater risk tolerances than would middle-level
employees.
Thus, to make sense of nancing constraints as an explanation for option usage, one needs to
identify conditions under which employees are the lowest-cost source of capital. Given that risk-
averse employees would demand a higher return than other investors, it must be that employees who
provide capital to their employers expect higher returns than other investors. This could result,
for example, from a potential employee having inside information from a friend working at the
company or from the employee simply having relatively high expectations for a rm or its industry.
This suggests that employees are the cheapest source of capital when they are more optimistic than
alternative investors regarding the rm's prospects, which is precisely the sorting idea we discussed
in Section 3.2.18
18The uncertain prospects of many start-up rms are likely to make it dicult for them to reward employees
14While we claim that the nancing constraints hypothesis is an incomplete form of the sorting
model, note that nancing constraints are not a necessary condition for the sorting model to hold.
Firms that have plenty of cash on hand would still have an incentive to use options as a form of
compensation if some potential employees value those options more highly than equity markets. In
fact, Oyer and Schaefer (2003) argue that sorting may explain Microsoft's long tradition of broad
equity grants even though Microsoft has plenty of cash available to fund current compensation
expenses.19 If sorting is an important determinant of broad option plans, but only some of the
time broad options help rms avoid raising money externally, this could explain the inconsistent
empirical correlation between option grants and proxies for nancing constraints.
3.4.2 Favorable Accounting Treatment
As Hall and Murphy (2003) emphasize, stock-option-based compensation receives a favorable ac-
counting treatment. If a rm pays an employee an additional $100 in wages, then this payment is
counted as an expense for the rm, and the rm's reported net income in the current period is lower
by $100. If, on the other hand, a rm gives an employee a stock option grant worth $100, then the
rm may elect not to recognize this as a compensation expense. Under this accounting regime, a
rm interested in boosting its share price in the short run may try to reduce compensation expense
by using options rather than cash. Magnitudes of option grants, however, must be disclosed. (Such
disclosures are the source of our SEC data set.) Unless equity prices fail to reect this publicly
available information, attempts to fool the market by shifting to option-based pay will fail. It is
not clear how precisely stock prices incorporate option grant information. Based on several papers,
including Aboody (1996), Huson, Scott and Wier (2001), and Aboody, Barth and Kasznik (2001),
it is generally accepted that market valuations are aected by this information. Bell, Landsman,
Miller and Yeh (2002) conrm that option grants aect valuations, but suggest that their ndings
\call into question whether investors assess correctly the eect of [employee stock options] on prof-
itable software rm value." Also, Garvey and Milbourn (2002) propose a trading rule based on the
through self-enforcing implicit contracts based on subjective measures of performance (see Bull (1987)). These rms
may therefore substitute toward explicit contracts based on share prices. While we believe this explanation may be
of some value in explaining the use of options in small startup rms, it cannot explain why a large, established rm
would grant options to all employees.
19Oyer and Schaefer (2003) also argue that the nancing constraints explanation for option grants suggests that
rms should issue stock, not options, to employees, because doing so results in smaller employee risk premiums.
15market's failure to perfectly incorporate option grant data.
Even if the market is not systematically fooled by rms' attempts to hide compensation expense
using stock options, top managers may still issue options to lower level employees if they naively
believe the market can be fooled, or if their own compensation depends more on accounting earnings
than share prices. This reasoning suggests that a corporate governance problem underlies rms'
decisions to issue options, as the separation of ownership and control permits managers to take
actions that owners would undo if they could.
While we acknowledge that accounting may have some eect, we argue that this rationale
is not solely responsible for the decision by rms to adopt broad-based option plans. We base
this on the implied cost of the corporate governance problem that would generate observed non-
executive option grants and on the fact that there is little evidence of any connection between
broad option grants and lax corporate governance. Oyer and Schaefer (2003) estimate that, if the
only benet of non-executive grants is favorable accounting treatment, a typical rm with a broad-
based stock option plan incurs real costs of about $3,000 per middle manager per year in order to
increase reported pre-tax income by about $9,000. In addition, a typical rm with a broad-based
plan exhibits a marginal willingness to pay $0.64 of actual costs (in the form of risk premium to
employees) in order to increase pre-tax income by one dollar. Given that compensation costs are
an important component of these rms' cost structure, it is dicult to imagine these rms could
stay competitive if they wasted resources at that rate.
There are several well-established facts that, taken together, suggest there is no connection
between lax corporate governance and broad option grants. First, ownership of equity by Chief
Executives rose dramatically during the 1990s (Murphy (2000)), which is the same time period as
option grants to non-executives grew (Hall and Murphy (2003)). Second, many rms that used
broad plans (such as Microsoft and Oracle) are managed by founders with very large equity stakes.
Third, corporate governance is no weaker (and perhaps somewhat stronger) among the types of rms
(for example, small rms and technology-based rms) that we show below to be relatively likely to
issue options broadly (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003)). Finally, some privately held rms elect
to issue stock options to employees. Accordingly, we take as our starting point the assertion that
broad-based stock option plans are in shareholders' interests, and search for underlying sources of
value creation.
164 Calibrations
In this section, we t data on stock option grants to the incentive, sorting, and retention models
discussed above. Here, we rely on the 2000 Survey on Current Practices in Broad-Based Stock
Option Plan Design conducted by the National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO). The
NCEO is a private, non-prot organization that provides members with information about employee
ownership programs. In March of 2000, they sent questionnaires to compensation administrators
at approximately two thousand companies seeking detailed information about their stock option
plans. The list of surveyed companies was compiled from several sources and all were thought likely
to have a stock option plan that covered at least half the company's employees. The NCEO received
247 detailed responses from rms that had stock option plans covering the majority of employees.
For each of these rms, we search the 2000 Ward's Business Directory for basic rm-level data,
such as primary SIC code, number of employees, year founded, and annual revenue. This survey
was not designed to cover a random sample of rms that might issue options, so we use the survey
only to analyze characteristics of observed plans.
4.1 Incentives
We begin by considering an incentives-based explanation for stock option use. As noted above,
agency theory suggests that the marginal return to eort and the ecacy of alternative performance
measures should be key determinants of the use of equity-based compensation. The fact that these
constructs are not observed by the econometrician makes assessing an agency-theoretic explanation
for option use very dicult in cross-sectional data. Because rms do not frequently vary the
variable that is of interest to us (namely, the existence of a broad option plan), we are limited to
cross-sectional data. As such, we supplement our across-rm analysis with a dierent approach.
The intuition underlying our incentives calibration is the following: If observed option grants are
optimal, then the marginal benet to the rm of making additional grants must equal the marginal
cost. The marginal benet comes from additional eort leading to additional productivity, while
the marginal cost comes from the fact that an employee must be compensated for bearing addi-
tional risk. We calibrate the rm's rst-order condition, using observed option packages, observed
variances of rms' market values, and information about individuals' typical levels of risk aversion.
This allows us to calculate the value, gross of risk and eort costs, associated with observed stock
option grants. We can also compute the employee's eort cost and risk premium. Given these g-
17ures, we can ask whether observed option grants appear to be consistent with an incentives-based
justication for stock option use.
Formally, we let v0 be the value of the rm as of the date of an option grant. Suppose the
employee makes an eort choice e that aects the terminal value of the rm (v1).20 Let the
cumulative distribution function of v1 conditional on e be represented by F(v1;e). We normalize
eort such that one unit increases the mean of v1 by $1. Let b be the fraction of any appreciation
in the rm's value that is given to the employee as part of the option grant. If the rm grants
options on n shares to an employee and has N shares outstanding, then b = n
n+N. The nal payo
to the employee from his grant of stock options is therefore given by max[b(v1   v0);0].
Suppose the employee has constant absolute risk aversion with coecient '. We use a Taylor
series approximation of the employee's utility function to write the employee's certainty equivalent
when holding random payo ~ x as E(~ x)   (1=2)'Var(~ x): Let the employee's utility in his next best
job be given by  u.
The rm's problem is to select a salary s and an option grant b to maximize its prots. The as-
sumption of no wealth eects allows us to simplify the rm's problem by substituting the employee's
participation constraint into the rm's objective. The rm selects b to maximize the total certainty


















Here, we have dened (e) to be the variance of max[v1 v0;0] conditional on the employee's eort
level.
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'b20(e) = 0; (1)
where f2 is the derivative of the density of the rm's terminal value with respect to the employee's
eort choice. We dene ^ e(b) as the solution to this equation | it is the employee's optimal eort
choice conditional on the rm's option grant.
20While we model this as though the agent works in isolation, e can be interpreted as the sum of all eort that is
distasteful (on the margin) to the employee and can include monitoring of co-workers. Also, the mapping of e to rm
value can include complementarities across workers so that the marginal contributions of individual workers can be
greater than the total rm value.






















This equation has an intuitive interpretation. The left-hand side is the amount by which the
value captured by the rm increases when b increases by a small amount. It is the product of the
derivative of eort with respect to b and the derivative of value captured by the rm with respect
to eort. The right-hand side is the amount the employee's risk premium increases when the rm
increases b. The optimal option grant equates this marginal benet to this marginal cost.
We rely on the rst-order conditions in Equations (1) and (2) in conducting our calibration
exercise. We take characteristics of the rm and its option grants from our NCEO data and make
assumptions regarding the distribution of the terminal value of the rm (f) and the risk aversion
of the employee ('). Given this, the only unknowns in this pair of rst-order conditions are the
employee's eort level e, and his marginal cost of eort c0(e). Assuming eort costs are quadratic
with second derivative c, we then have two equations with two unknowns, which we can solve
numerically. Our normalization of eort means that a calculation of e gives the dollar value of the
employee's increased production coming about as a result of the option grant. Given c, we can
compute the cost to the employee of exerting this eort. We can also compute the risk premium
the employee applies to the option grant.
To tailor our analysis to the stock-based pay context, we make a number of assumptions. First,
we let one period in our model correspond to four calendar years. The employee receives an option
grant at the beginning of the rst year and either exercises his options or leaves the rm (forfeiting
the option value) at the end of the fourth year. This assumption is motivated by the fact that
most option packages granted by rms in our NCEO data are fully vested after four years, and
that research on option granting behavior by lower-level employees suggests that a large fraction
of these options are exercised very shortly after vesting.21 The assumption implies that the value
(to the risk-neutral rm) of the option is equivalent to the Black-Scholes value of an option that
expires after four years. We use this as the cost to the rm of issuing the options to the employee.
21For example, Aboody (1996) shows that, in a sample of 478 rms with relatively large numbers of outstanding
options, most rms issue options with a ten-year term and most options were exercised in the rst four years after the
grant date. Huddart and Lang (1996) study a sample of eight rms, and report that about half of all options were
exercised in the rst half of the options' term. At the public companies in our NCEO sample, survey respondents
indicated that approximately 25% of options were exercised immediately upon vesting, an additional 31% were
exercised within a year after vesting, and 21% were exercised between one and two years after vesting.
19Second, we assume that the distribution of the terminal value of the rm follows a log-normal
distribution. The mean of this distribution is given by v0(1 + r)4 + e, where v0 is the value of the
rm at time zero, r is the annual expected return on the rm's shares, and e is the eort level chosen
by the employee. We set r = 10% in our analysis. The standard deviation of this distribution is
given by 2v0, where  is the expected annual standard deviation of the rm's return.
For public companies in our NCEO sample, we estimate a historical value of  using stock
return data from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) from 1995 through 2000. For
the 86 companies that are private or for which historical stock returns are insucient, we compute
a historical  using the predicted level from a regression of  on the rm's number of employees
using the 130 companies for which we can compute historical volatilities. For our calculation of
option values, we would like to apply expectation of future stock volatility, rather than the historical
volatility we compute. Implied volatilities from options markets show that future and historical
levels are similar in short forward-looking horizons (a year or two), but markets going out four
years do not exist. We therefore assume that future volatilities will be the minimum of 0.75 and
75% as high as the computed historical volatilities.
We consider two possible values for the employee's level of risk aversion, and two possible
employee cost-of-eort functions. Friend and Blume (1975) and Hall and Murphy (2002) argue
that 2.5 is a rough lower bound on the average person's coecient of relative risk aversion ().
To allow for the possibility that option-based pay attracts a selection of risk-tolerant employees,
however, we use a relative risk aversion value of one in our basic specication. We convert this to
an Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion (as required by our agency model) by dividing
by the employee's wealth level, which we assume to be ve times the annual salary paid by the
rm to middle managers. We also consider the case where middle managers are of \average" risk
tolerance (that is,  = 2:5). In our basic specication, we assume quadratic eort costs with second
derivative c. We also apply c(e) = 1
4ce4.
In Table 3, we present a summary of the results from this exercise. We select four rms, one
from each employment size quartile, from our NCEO data. Note rst that the value of option
grants to middle managers varies considerably in the sample. The typical rm grants options
with a Black-Scholes value equal to approximately one year of salary, though the \Large Firm" in
column (4) grants three years of salary to new middle managers (worth a total of over a quarter of
a million dollars.) Note, however, that while some of these rms make valuable grants, the middle
manager typically owns a very small fraction of the rm (less than one one-thousandth of a percent
20Table 3: Calibration | Incentives
Small Firm Med-Small Firm Med-Large Firm Large Firm Medians
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Employees < 50 < 100 300 10,000+ 180
Middle Manager Salary $38 $100 $90 $90 90
Employee Share (b) 0.015% 0.052% 0.009% 0.00011% 0.0404%
Firm Value (April 2000 { $millions) < $100 $200  $300 >$50,000 $230
Stock Volatility () > 75% > 75% < 75% >50% 72%
Black-Scholes Value $52 $95 $11 $272 $92




Eort (e) $10.2 $9.3 $0.18 $63.5 $8.71
Cost of Eort (c(e)) $0.0026 $0.0014 $0.000005 $0.000023 $0.0010
Risk Premium $4.6 $4.3 $0.088 $22.6 $2.76




Eort (e) $50.6 $35.9 $0.457 $1,511.5 $148.5
Cost of Eort (c(e)) $0.011 $0.0054 $0.000012 $0.0005 $0.011
Risk Premium $11.5 $10.9 $0.22 $56.5 $6.92




Eort (e) $31.7 $29.1 $0.683 $223.5 $28.5
Cost of Eort (c(e)) $0.0040 $0.0023 $0.000010 $0.0004 $0.0019
Risk Premium $4.6 $4.3 $0.088 $22.6 $2.76
Risk-free rate is assumed to be 5%. Options assumed to expire in ten years and fully vest in four years. All dollar
values are in thousands except rm value.
21in the case of the large rm). In contrast, \senior managers" of these same rms get grants of
approximately eight times as many shares and the top executives of some of the bigger rms get
grants that are several orders of magnitude greater than grants to middle managers.22 Therefore,
though the BLS statistics in Section 2 indicate that high paid non-executives, such as the middle
managers we study, receive the majority of total option grants, we expect the incentive eects of
these grants to be very dierent from those for top executive analyzed by, for example, Hall and
Murphy (2002).
We present results from three calibrations for each of the four rms in the table. The rst
calibration assumes quadratic eort costs and absolute risk aversion of one divided by ve times
salary. The second assumes quadratic eort costs and absolute risk aversion of 2.5 divided by salary.
The third assumes eort costs of 1
4ce4 and absolute risk aversion of one divided by ve times salary.
Because one period in our model corresponds to four calendar years, we annualize all gures in our
table by dividing by four. We also display the sample medians for all values in the table.
We focus rst on the smallest rm, listed in Column (1). This rm has a small number of
employees, and makes modest option grants to middle-level managers. Assuming quadratic eort
costs and a coecient of absolute risk aversion of one, our model computes that the employee's
additional productivity coming about as a result of the option grant is $10,200, annually. The
risk premium the employee attaches to his annual compensation on account of the option grant is
$4,600. The annual cost to the employee of exerting this additional eort is $2.60.
The second calibration for this rm yields larger gures for eort and eort costs. To see the
intuition for this, recall that our model solves for eort using the rm's rst-order condition, which
states that the marginal benet and marginal cost associated with additional option grants must be
equal. If employees are more risk averse, then the marginal cost to the rm of using option-based
pay is higher. Hence, rms are willing to make the observed grants only if the responsiveness of
eort to incentives is higher. For the small rm, the model indicates that the option grant causes
a middle-level employee to produce an additional $50,600 annually, at annual risk and eort costs
of $11,500 and $11, respectively. The third calibration also yields higher eort gures than did
22The dierence between non-executives and top 5 proxy-listed executives (which is the group typically studied) is
very stark in the Execucomp dataset. Using 1996-2002, we used our methodology to estimate the value of grants to
executives and non-executives at rms that meet our \SEC Plan1" criteria. The average (median) grants to the CEO
73 (89) are times as great as grants per non-executive. The average (median) grants to a non-CEO top 5 executive
are 17 (22) times as great as grants per non-executive.
22the rst. The cost-of-eort function here is atter, meaning employees are more responsive to
low-powered incentives. For the small rm, the model indicates that the option grant causes a
middle-level employee to produce an additional $31,700 annually, at annual risk and eort costs of
$4,600 and $4, respectively.
Calibrations for the three other rms yield widely diering magnitudes. Our medium-large rm
is notable in that it makes small option grants to middle managers. These grants impose small
risk costs on employees, so the model infers that the value created and eort costs incurred by
employees must be small as well. Our largest rm makes grants with a large Black-Scholes value,
but because the rm has a very large number of shares outstanding, the employee's resulting share
(b) is very small. The model therefore infers that weak incentives must motivate employees to
create a large amount of value. For this rm, the employee creates an additional $63,500 annually,
at risk and eort costs of $22,600 and 2.3 cents.
We conclude from this exercise that the provision of incentives does not appear very plausible
as an explanation for option-based pay. We base this conclusion on the following observation: In
the case of the small rm and the rst set of assumptions, options bring $10,200 of additional
benets into the employee/rm relationship at a total cost (not including the risk costs) of less
than three dollars. If this were the case, it seems clear that the parties' inability to contract on
eort is generating a very substantial underprovision of eort. This dierence, which strikes us as
implausibly large, is implied by our agency model combined with the assumption that observed
option grants reect optimal incentives. This comparison is even more dramatic in the case of the
large rm, where the additional benets and costs of options are $63,500 and about two cents,
respectively.
The question we are left with is the following: Couldn't the rm, at a cost of less than $22,600,
devise some other means of identifying whether an employee has taken actions that increase the
value of the rm at trivial cost to the employee, and then reward the employee directly for these
actions? Or, put another way, if additional eort would bring some amount on the order of $63,500
into the employment relationship at a cost of a few cents, wouldn't the rm and employee gure
out some way to split that surplus that did not require the employee to bear so much risk that
the surplus was largely depleted? Even if \eort" cannot be objectively measured, it appears to
us relatively straightforward for rms to use various forms of subjective performance evaluation
to reward employees for value they create. Given our calculations here, we nd it very dicult
to believe that stock options could be the most ecient incentive mechanism available to rms.
23The most favorable case that can be made for options-as-incentives is this: options are sensible for
incentive purposes under a very limited set of circumstances | namely, if employees take actions
that have large value implications for the rm, the costs to the employee of taking these actions
are very small, and it is extremely dicult for rms to observe whether employees are taking these
actions.
4.2 Sorting
We now consider the sorting model discussed in Section 3.2, where potential employees vary in their
beliefs about the rm's prospects. The intuition underlying our sorting calibration is the following:
If sorting drives observed option grants, then the employee must prefer receiving the observed
option package to an all-cash compensation package that costs the rm the same amount. Hence,
we proceed by rst computing the cost to the rm (salary plus Black-Scholes value of options) of
observed compensation packages. We assume the rm would be willing to oer the employee an
all-cash package costing the same amount, and then compute the set of values for employee risk
tolerance and beliefs as to the rm's expected return under which the employee prefers the observed
option package to the all-cash package.
We vary our analysis somewhat from the prior section while retaining most of the same basic
assumptions. Let one period of our model correspond to four calendar years. Suppose again that
options vest after four years, and that the employee exercises all options immediately upon vesting.
Let v1 be the terminal value of the rm, and suppose the employee believes it to be log-normally
distributed with mean v0(1 + r)4 and standard deviation 2v0, where  is the annual standard
deviation of returns. We determine the options' value when issued (which we use as the cost to the
rm) using Black-Scholes assuming expiration in four years. Let the employee have constant relative
risk aversion with initial wealth equal to his annual salary.23 We make assumptions regarding tax
rates applied to three types of income: current salary, options prots, and additional cash salary the
employee would receive if he got no stock options. Current salary is inframarginal in this analysis,
so we apply s = 20% to capture an estimate of average tax rates in calculating utility. The other
two types of earnings are marginal, so we apply b = 40%.
Results are displayed graphically in Figures 1 through 4. To produce these graphs, we place
the employee's coecient of relative risk aversion on the x-axis and his expectation as to the
23While constant absolute risk aversion allowed us to simplify our analysis in the previous section, constant relative






































Agent prefers observed 
cash plus option 
package.
Agent would prefer all-
cash alternative.
Tax advantage makes 
option package 
preferable.
Figure 1: Small rm employee's preferences over compensation plans for dierent values of r and
.
rm's annual stock return on the y-axis. For each point on this plane, we can compute whether
an employee with these preferences and beliefs prefers the observed option package or an all-cash
package that costs the rm the same amount. We also identify a region in which the tax advantages
tips the employee's preference toward the option package. The four rms shown in the gures are
the same four that we highlighted in Table 3.
We rst consider an employee with coecient of relative risk aversion 2.5 who expects his
rm's share price to increase by 10% per year. At our small, medium-small, and large rms
(Figures 1, 2, and 4), such an employee prefers an all-cash package costing the rm the same
amount. The medium-large rm makes small option grants, and such an employee would prefer
the observed salary plus option package because of the tax advantages. These conclusions do not
change markedly when the employee is less risk averse. Lowering the employee's  to 1 does not
justify the use of options at the small, medium-small, or large rm, but the gap between the cost
to the rm and the employee's valuation becomes smaller.
Next, we keep the employee's risk aversion relatively low, but assume he expects 25% annual






































Agent prefers observed 
cash plus option 
package.
Agent would prefer all-
cash alternative.
Tax advantage makes 
option package 
preferable.
Figure 2: Med-Small rm employee's preferences over compensation plans for dierent values of r
and .
Figures 1 through 4 now prefer the option package, as do the employees at 205 of the 216 rms in
our sample. While 25% may seem like an excessively optimistic expectation, it is well below the
average return at these rms in 1999. If employees naively believe there is momentum in share
prices, then perhaps this gure is not far from accurate.
As discussed in Section 3.2, one reason why rms may attach options to the employment re-
lationship (as opposed to simply letting employees trade on their own accounts) is if optimistic
employees are more productive. If this is the case, then our assertion above that rms are indier-
ent between oering observed option packages and an all-cash package costing the rm the same
amount is inaccurate. Firms would strictly prefer the option package if granting it also attracts a
more productive employee. In this case, we can use our estimates from Table 3 to provide an esti-
mate of what level of productivity dierences would justify the options grants in the NCEO data.
The expected return in these estimates is 10%, suggesting the employee is only mildly optimistic.
Depending on which rm we consider and what level of risk aversion we assume, optimistic em-
ployees would have to be anywhere from less than $100 to over $50,000 more productive annually.





































n Agent prefers observed 
cash plus option 
package.
Agent would prefer all-
cash alternative.
Tax advantage makes 
option package 
preferable.
Figure 3: Med-Large rm employee's preferences over compensation plans for dierent values of r
and .
(4)) seem implausible. However, the dierences at the other rms and at the median rm appear
consistent with the possibility that rms are willing to compensate optimistic workers for part of
the risk premium of options compensation in order to attract more productive workers.
In general, we believe these results suggest that the sorting model could be at least a contributing
factor in explaining why some rms oer stock options to lower level employees. If potential
employees are somewhat risk tolerant and have optimistic views about the future of the rm,
then employees will value cash-plus-options packages at more than their cost (net of productivity
dierences) to the rm. Full conrmation of this model will require an examination of across-rm
variation in who uses stock options. Our calculations here indicate that, holding the employee's risk
aversion constant, rms with lower stock volatility can more eciently use stock options. Firms
in the NCEO sample tend, however, to have very high volatilities. The fact that high-volatility
rms use options is consistent with sorting only if these rms hire a selection of very risk tolerant






































n Agent prefers observed 
cash plus option 
package.
Agent would prefer all-
cash alternative.
Tax advantage makes 
option package 
preferable.
Figure 4: Large rm employee's preferences over compensation plans for dierent values of r and
.
4.3 Retention
We now consider Oyer's (2003) explanation of option-based pay as a means for indexing the value of
employees' deferred compensation to their outside options. The intuition underlying our retention
calibration is the following: If options are intended to help rms index wages to market conditions,
then short-run variation in the value of option packages must be of the same order of magnitude as
short-run variation in spot wages. Given our detailed NCEO data on option grants, we can compute
the short-run variation in the value of option packages, and use this to infer rms' expectations
regarding wage variation.
We adjust the timing of our discussion somewhat to reect the additional complexity of this
model. Whereas previously we allowed one period in our model to represent four calendar years, we
now assume that one period represents one calendar year. We assume a rm hires an employee at
time t = 0. Between t = 0 and t = 1, one of three states of the world is realized. With probability
qg (qb), industry conditions are revealed to be \good" (\bad"). Conditions are \unchanged" with
probability 1   qg   qb: The rm operates until time t = 4, and then the model ends.
28Industry conditions aect both labor and nancial markets. If industry conditions are good,
then the employee could, at time t = 1 obtain a job oer from another employer that pays wage
Sg. If conditions are unchanged or bad, then the best oer the employee can get is Su or Sb ,
respectively, with Sg > Su > Sb. Share prices are aected as follows:
E[v1 jGood state] = vg
E[v1 jUnchanged state] = vu
E[v1 jBad state] = vb:
We let the unconditional expectation of v1 equal vu, which implies qh(vg   vu) = qb(vu   vb). We
also assume Var[v1 js] = (3=5)2 for each state s 2 fg;u;bg: In words, the variance of rm value
conditional on industry prospects is equal to 60% of the unconditional variance, which means 40% of
the total variance is determined by industry conditions.24 To compute the v values, we rst assume
an expected rate of return, r, on the rm's shares. This determines vu, as E[v1] = vu = (1 + r)v0.
We then solve for magnitudes vg and vb so that the unconditional variance of the rm's return is
equal to 2:
When making hiring decisions, the rm must decide between oering spot wages and oering
an option-based package. If the rm chooses spot wages, then it pays the employee Su in the rst
year. If industry conditions then turn good, the employee seeks an outside oer prior to t = 1. The
rm matches the oer and incurs transaction cost k in doing so.25 If conditions turn bad, then the
rm cannot adjust the employee's wage downward. After the rst-period uncertainty is revealed, no
further changes in industry conditions occur, and the employee works for three additional periods
at the set wage. Hence, the expected cost to the rm of oering the spot wage job is
Su + 3

qgSg + (1   qg)Su

+ qgk:
An option-based compensation package consists of a salary Sopt and an option grant consisting of
n options with initial Black-Scholes value BS(v0). We assume that the employee decides whether to
24We experimented with other allocations of risk between rms and industries, but found that it made surprisingly
little dierence. The choice of 60% idiosyncratic risk is based on several regressions we ran of individual rm returns
on the NASDAQ composite index or the Dow Jones Internet Commerce and Internet Service Indexes. In practice,
the amount of idiosyncratic risk is often reduced by rms' lowering the strike price of options.
25Alternatively, the parameter k can be interpreted as a turnover cost | if the employee leaves, then the rm hires
a new employee at the prevailing spot wage. Such a cost can arise from training or search.
29seek an outside oer after observing the realization of industry conditions, but before observing the
realization of the idiosyncratic shock to his rm's value.26 The rm designs its option package with
the aim of preventing the employee from seeking an outside oer in any state of the world.27 If the
good state is realized, then the employee will choose not to seek an outside oer if, in expectation,
he values his compensation from his current job at more than that at the next best job. If the
employee does not seek another oer, then he remains with the rm and does not exercise any
options until t = 4. If the employee seeks an oer and takes it, then he exercises one-quarter of his






















where f(js) is the probability density function of the log-normal with mean vs and variance 3
52v,
and g(j) is probability density function of the log-normal with mean (1 + r)3v1 and variance
32v.28 The rm prefers oering the option-based job to the spot wage job if
Su + 3

qgSg + (1   qg)Su

+ qgk > 4Sopt + BS(v0): (4)
These inequalities allow us to compute upper bounds on Sg;Su; and Sb , and a lower bound on k.
We also compute the \retention value" | that is, the Black-Scholes dollar value of options forfeited
in the event the employee leaves | under the good and bad industry states.
The rst case we consider, with r = 10% and  = 2:5, suggest that contracting costs would have
to be large at many rms in our sample in order for a retention argument to explain option grants
made by rms in columns (1) and (3). In the event that spot wages increase, costs associated with
re-contracting or replacing a manager for the rm in column (1) would have to be $45,000 in order
to justify the observed option grants.29 While human resource professionals say that replacement
26It may be more realistic to assume that the employee observes the value of the rm before determining whether
to seek an outside oer. Under this assumption, the employee would seek an outside oer whenever the idiosyncratic
shock to rm value is suciently negative. In designing its option package, the rm would need to choose under what
realizations of idiosyncratic shocks it wants the option package to be large enough to retain the employee.
27This assumption | that turnover is never ecient | is a simplication. A more complex version of this model
would trade o costs of adjusting wages with benets of ecient matching.
28Note also that we assume the employee's outside wealth to be equal to Sopt.
29As noted above, we assume that, if spot wages decrease, the rm cannot lower the employee's cash compensation.
30Table 4: Calibration | Retention
Small Firm Med-Small Firm Med-Large Firm Large Firm Median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Annual Cash Compensation (from NCEO survey)
$38 $100 $90 $90 $90
Case One: r
 = 10%; = 2:5
Initial Spot Wage (Su) $41.3 $109.1 $92.3 $126.4 $92.6
High Spot Wage (Sg) $42.7 $112.6 $93.5 $139.5 $93.7
Low Spot Wage (Sb) $39.1 $104.1 $90.9 $113.3 $90.5
Retention Value { High $44.8 $71.6 $9.7 $190.8 $71.0
Retention Value { Low $6.7 $10.7 $1.5 $60.1 $15.6
Transaction Cost (k) $45.3 $10.9 $0 $14.0 $33.3
Case Two: r
 = 10%; = 1
Initial Spot Wage (Su) $44.6 $113.9 $92.6 $144.6 $99.4
High Spot Wage (Sg) $48.3 $121.2 $94.1 $166.5 $104.6
Low Spot Wage (Sb) $40.1 $105.6 $91.0 $123.6 $91.6
Retention Value { High $44.8 $71.6 $9.7 $190.8 $71.0
Retention Value { Low $6.7 $10.7 $1.5 $60.1 $15.6
Transaction Cost (k) $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Case Three: r
 = 25%; = 1
Initial Spot Wage (Su) $51.5 $126 7 $95.2 $241.7 $113.1
High Spot Wage (Sg) $57.8 $138.7 $97.7 $284.7 $125.3
Low Spot Wage (Sb) $44.4 $113.4 $92.5 $199.1 $100.6
Retention Value { High $50.4 $80.7 $11.0 $240.9 $81.8
Retention Value { Low $10.6 $16.9 $2.4 $97.1 $24.7
Transaction Cost (k) $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Risk-free rate is assumed to be 5%. \Initial spot wage" is the implied market wage when middle manager receives
the options grant and, if there is no common shock, one year later. \High spot wage" (\Low spot wage") is the
implied maximum market wage for a middle manager one year after the options are granted and after a positive
(negative) common shock. \Transaction cost" is the minimum expected costs the rm would incur over a four year
period due to changes in the agent's compensation package and/or replacing the agent in order to justify the
amount of stock options it grants to a middle manager. \Retention value" indicates expected Black-Scholes value
(assuming he expects to exercise options four years after they are issued) forfeited if the employee takes the outside
oer, given the value of the common shock.
31costs can be 25 to 50% of annual wages for some jobs, our estimates for the small rm and the
median rm are at the high end of this range.
The second case, which assumes the worker is risk averse but less so ( = 1), lead to much more
plausible estimates of the turnover or renegotiation costs necessary to justify the use of options.
In all four rms in the table, for the median rm, and for a total of 134 of the 216 rms in our
sample, our estimates suggest that rms benet from using options even if they do not lower the
cost of raising an employee's wage. That is, the rms in the table can justify the use of options
at any positive turnover cost.30 However, for this conclusion to be credible, the model suggests
that options can be used for retention purposes if spot wages uctuate up or down anywhere from
$2,000 to $20,000 over a short period. In this second set of estimates, the turnover or renegotiation
costs are negligible and the amount of unvested option value would have a signicant eect on
employee retention. Therefore, the results suggest that the retention model can justify the use
of stock options, if market wages for managers in this sample really vary by as much as Table 4
suggests.
The third case combines the sorting and retention models, by assuming the employee is opti-
mistic regarding the rm's share price. Here, the retention argument can explain option grants even
if spot wages vary $5,000 to $40,000 over a short horizon. The retention values grow as employees
value their holdings more highly, and the critical values of turnover costs fall even further below
zero. Note that the assumptions underlying the retention model reinforce the sorting model be-
cause, by assuming stock options only expose the employee to idiosyncratic risk on the margin, they
lower the risk premium the employee would otherwise need to be paid. We therefore believe that
the last two subsections and the bottom part of Table 4 provide evidence that some combination
of sorting and retention could be contributing to decisions to issue stock options rm-wide.
As a result, our estimates of renegotiation costs only relate to the case of retaining the worker if his spot market wage
increases.
30All else equal, options are relatively more attractive to employees in this section's analysis than in section 4.2
because employees are exposed to some risk regardless of what form their compensation takes. If the rm oers the
spot wage job, the employee's compensation will uctuate due to changes in spot wages.
325 Cross-Firm Variation in Option Plans
In this section, we analyze cross-sectional variation in option plan adoption using our SEC data.31
We estimate a series of logit models using \SEC Plan," as dened in Section 2, as our dependent
variable. To verify that our ndings are not sensitive to the denition of our dependent variable,
we dene two additional indicators of option plans. SEC Plan2 equals one if the Black-Scholes
value of options granted per non-executive employee in 1998 was at least $1,000. Option grants
are disproportionately made to new employees, so we construct a third indicator | SEC Plan3
| that adjusts for the possibility that option granting behavior depends on employment growth.
We assume that all non-executive grants are given to new employees, and estimate the number of
new employees to be the sum of the 1997 to 1998 increase in employment and 10% of the 1997
employment. We then set SEC Plan3 equal to one if the Black-Scholes value of options granted to
each new employee is at least $2,500. Because these additional variables are constructed using the
market value of options granted, they are, by denition, related to rm and/or industry volatility.
In regressions using these variables, we omit rm and industry volatility.
The explanatory variables include measures related to the comparative static implications of
each model, as well as control variables. All of our analyses include controls for the log of the
number of employees at the rm, the growth in number of employees from 1997 to 1998, and
an indicator variable for \new economy" status, as dened above. Note the predicted eects of
these controls on option usage do not vary in a way that would allow us to distinguish between
the models. In unreported specications, we also controlled for two-digit SIC code. This did not
materially aect the results.
Agency theory predicts a negative relationship between risk and incentives, so the incentive
model implies that option plans should be less common at high volatility rms. If higher volatility
also reects higher variance in people's beliefs about a rm, then the sorting model predicts that
higher volatility rms (or rms in higher volatility industries) will be more likely to make broad
option grants. The retention model predicts that non-executive option plans will be negatively
related to idiosyncratic rm volatility, but positively related to the volatility of the set of rms that
compete for a given group of employees. To test these implications, we use two volatility measures
as explanatory variables. First, we include monthly rm stock volatility. In addition, we include
31We use the SEC data because it constitutes a random sample of public rms. However, we redid the analysis in
this section for each year from 1996 through 2001 using all rms in Standard & Poors Execucomp dataset. Virtually
without exception, that analysis led to the same conclusions as the results we present below.
33\industry volatility," which we dene as the standard deviation of the monthly average return for
all CRSP rms in a given 4-digit SIC code industry.32
The retention model predicts that option plans will be more common at rms whose returns
are more closely related to the returns of other rms that compete for the same set of workers. To
test this implication, we generated a variable that we refer to as \industry volatility share." To
construct this variable, we rst run regressions of each CRSP rm's monthly returns on industry
returns.33 We average the R2 from these regressions and dene this as the industry volatility share.
Finally, we include variables that proxy for variance in potential employees' beliefs about future
returns and nancing constraints. These include an indicator variable for positive cash ow in
1998, 1998 cash ow as a fraction of beginning-of-year capital, and 1998 investment as a fraction
of beginning-of-year capital. We also include cash ow and investment as a fraction of beginning-
of-year market capitalization.
Results are in Table 5. First, note that option plans are more common at smaller rms and new
economy rms. Firms with more employees are signicantly less likely to have broad stock option
plans. A rm with 10% more employees than another rm is one to one-and-a-half percentage
points less likely to have a broad-based plan.34 New economy rms have a 33 percentage point
higher probability of using a broad-based plan, holding the other factors in column (1) constant.
In contrast to the basic agency theory of an inverse risk/incentive relationship, we nd that
a rm with volatility that is 10 percentage points higher than another rm is more likely by 13
percentage points (that is, the probability increases by about one third) to have a broad plan. This
provides further support for our conclusion in Section 4.1 that incentives are not an important
cause of rms' decision to adopt broad option plans. The dramatically higher volatility of plan
rms (and, as discussed below, their industries) contradicts every \informativeness" agency model.
Column (2) shows that the positive relationship between risk and option plans is largely driven
by industry volatility rather than idiosyncratic rm volatility. Industry volatility is positively (and
32We exclude observations where there are not at least eight rms available to construct industry return.
33For inclusion here, we require rms to have twelve observations of monthly returns.
34Core and Guay (2001) report the opposite result, namely that the value of options grants per employee increases
with rm size. Recall from our discussion in Section 2 that they dene any option grant to an employee other than
the ve highest paid executives as a grant to a \non-executive." When we apply their denition, we also nd that the
likelihood of broad option plans increases with rm size. Thus, it seems their nding may be indicative that non-top
ve executives receive larger option grants at larger rms. Also note that this negative size/option plan relationship
holds up in every year of the Execucomp dataset.
34signicantly) related to option plans and, when controlling for industry volatility, rm volatility is
not signicantly related to option plans. This is consistent with the industry versus rm volatility
prediction of the retention model.35 While the sorting model does not have as explicit a prediction
about the relative importance of industry and rm volatility, this model is also consistent with the
results in Table 5 if volatility is correlated with variance in employees' expectations about future
returns.
We also add \industry volatility share" as an explanatory variable in column (2) and in the
logits that use SEC Plan2 and SEC Plan3 as the dependent variable. While this variable does not
show a signicant relationship to option plan status in columns (2) and (6), it is positively and
signicantly related to SEC Plan2. This is consistent with the retention model because it suggests
that rms are more likely to grant options if their returns are more closely related to other rms
that could employ their workers.
In column (2), we nd that positive cash ow is associated with a 22 percentage point lower
probability (that is, it drops by approximately two thirds) of implementing a broad-based stock
option plan. While this provides some potential support for the nancing constraints hypothesis,
columns (4) show that the other controls for nancing constraints are not related to option grants.
When we use SEC Plan2 or SEC Plan3 as the dependent variable, we nd that rms that are
making large investments relative to capital are more likely to have option plans. However, rms
that are making larger investments relative to the value of their equity are, if anything, less likely
to have option plans.
We believe the relationship between cash ow and option plans (and between investments and
option plans) is consistent with the sorting model. Making investments (either in capital or in
funding negative cash ow operations) does not necessarily indicate that a rm faces nancing
constraints. On the other hand, it does seem that investing rms are likely to be rms where
future returns are variable and where the expectations about future returns vary across potential
employees. If this is true, this suggests that rms are nancing through employees when there are
employees whose beliefs make them a relatively inexpensive source of capital.
We believe that the results in Table 5 are consistent with both the sorting and retention models,
but they provide little reason to reverse our belief that incentive eects are not important in broad-
based option plans. Though the negative association between employees and option plans would
35Carter and Lynch (2003) provide related cross-sectional support for the importance of retention. They show that
option repricing is correlated with reductions in employee turnover.
35Table 5: SEC Option Plan Logits
Dependent Variable SEC Plan SEC Plan SEC Plan SEC Plan SEC Plan2 SEC Plan3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Employees -0.1472 -0.1188 -0.1209 -0.1231 -0.1770 -0.1226
(0.0146) (0.0172) (0.0196) (0.0181) (0.0228) (0.0190)
Employee Growth 0.0763 0.0817 0.0310 0.0562 0.0702 -0.0449
(0.0441) (0.0485) (0.0383) (0.0478) (0.0545) (0.0163)
Firm Volatility 1.3232 0.6306 0.3029 0.5436
(0.3279) (0.4071) (0.4212) (0.4183)
New Economy 0.3291 0.2764 0.2512 0.2815 0.3512 0.1912
(0.0676) (0.0738) (0.0757) (0.0749) (0.0775) (0.0666)
Positive Cash Flow -0.2215 -0.2256 -0.2225 -0.2371 0.0574
(0.0745) (0.0749) (0.0827) (0.0779) (0.0710)
Industry Volatility 2.3205 1.9704 2.1861
(0.9440) (0.9881) (0.9497)
Industry Volatility Share -0.0831 0.5065 0.1888
(0.1780) (0.2106) (0.1878)
Investment/Value -0.1125 -0.6078 -0.3424
(0.1919) (0.2741) (0.2227)







2 0.2818 0.2763 0.3057 0.2822 0.3962 0.2234
Sample Size 765 573 479 549 479 439
Dependent variables, described in the text, are various indicator variables for whether a rm has a
broad-based stock option plan. Data are from a random sample of 1,000 rms that led annual reports and
proxy statements with the SEC in 1999. Sample size in each logit is based on the number of rms for
which nancial information, as well as industry stock return, was available. \New Economy" indicates
primary SIC code is 3570-3579, 3661, 3674, 5045, 5961, or 7370-7379. Coecients are marginal eects on
the probability that the rm has a plan. Standard errors are in parentheses.
36lend some support to the moral hazard explanation of option use, our previous numerical analysis
suggests that the marginal eects of the number of employees on incentives dissipate quickly as
a rm grows and that these rms are generally above the level where we would expect such an
association between size and incentives. More importantly, the strong positive relationship between
risk and option plans contradicts a central prediction of the incentive model.
6 Conclusion
Using rm-level data on stock option grants and nancial information, we have tried to reconcile the
fact that some rms issue stock options to lower-level employees with economic theory. We focused
on three classes of model { moral hazard, sorting on worker beliefs about the rm's prospects, and
stock options as a relatively inexpensive way to adjust worker compensation to market conditions.
Using details on the stock option plans for middle managers at a sample of over 200 rms, we
showed that stock options appear to be an incredibly inecient means of providing incentives to
employees. By calibrating an agency model to data on actual grants of stock options to middle-level
employees, we computed that risk premia associated with these grants are typically several orders
of magnitude larger than the cost to employees of the resulting increases in eort. Our calibrations
suggest that, if a typical rm in our sample were granting options to middle managers as a means of
inducing them to increase eort, the rm would be paying each employee many thousands of dollars
in risk premium in order to generate added eort that the employee values at less (often much less)
than $100. We conclude, based on these calculations, that stock options are an inecient incentive
mechanism for middle managers.
Though we cannot conclusively determine how important either model is, we interpret our
analysis as consistent with both the sorting and retention models. We show that, if workers are
suciently optimistic about their employers' prospects, stock options may be an ecient means
of compensation. That is, despite demanding compensation for risk, optimistic employees may
be willing to accept a large enough reduction in cash compensation to warrant using options as
compensation. We also show that, if spot labor market rates are fairly variable and reducing worker
wages is costly, then the correlation between the value of a worker's stock option holdings and his
reservation utility may induce the rm to issue stock options.
We believe that neither accounting treatment of option grants, cash constraints, nor any of the
three models we examined in this paper can single-handedly explain the use of broad-based stock
37option plans. The belief that the accounting treatment of options is solely responsible for their
widespread use seems inconsistent with the cross-sectional variation in adoption of option plans
and with the fact that so many rms with broad plans have been successful for long periods. As
we discussed in Section 3.4, employees are too expensive a source of capital to justify the cash
constraints explanation. We believe our estimates in Section 4.1 rule out the incentive model as a
primary (much less exclusive) justication for broad option plans.
We think that the evidence in this paper suggests that sorting or retention may be rst-order
determinants of a typical rm's decision to adopt a broad-based stock option plan. But neither
explanation can stand completely on its own. The sorting model begs a critical question of why rms
and employees would agree to make employees' beliefs part of an inexible employment contract,
given that the tax advantages of using options are not very large relative to cash compensation. We
also believe that, while we have demonstrated that stock options can be a useful tool for making
compensation vary with an employee's market wage, it is a fairly crude tool for this purpose. If rms
received no other benets from option grants besides savings on the costs of adjusting compensation
agreements, it seems likely they would try to nd more specialized measures of employee's market
value that did not expose the employee to so much idiosyncratic rm risk. It is therefore our
belief that the rms that adopt broad option plans are those where the returns to cost eectively
attracting and retaining employees is particularly high. But those rms may well choose option
plans (as opposed to stock grants, prot sharing, or other pay mechanisms) as a means towards
these ends for secondary reasons such as accounting treatment or a need to nd a simple metric
upon which to base pay.
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